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NONE QUIET ON THE MICHIGAN FRONT: THE CONSTITUTION
& MICHIGAN’S WAR ON TESLA

David Stewart*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Most vehicles in the United States are powered by an internal
combustion engine (“ICE”) or are electric vehicles (“EVs”). ICEs
comprise the lion’s share of vehicles on the road, but viable EVs
are quickly coming into vogue. 1 Experts expect EV sales to grow
in popularity amid environmental concerns. 2 Although heritage
car makers like General Motors have dabbled in EV technology in
the past, Tesla is one of the first companies to successfully dedicate
its entire business to EV manufacturing. 3 As of 2020, Tesla is by
far the single largest manufacturer of EVs relative to the United
States market. 4

* J.D. Candidate, 2022 Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Economics, Penn
State University, 2019. Before we begin, a few thank-yous are in order. To my family,
you have always supported me, and I will forever cherish that. Professor Marina Lao,
my adviser, you have been a source of infinite wisdom in my first academic
enterprise. Professor Michael B. Coenen, my constitutional law professor, I have
long joked that I have looked forward to constitutional law since high school; your
class let me enjoy writing a paper about the Constitution. Professor Amy Newcombe,
my legal writing professor, you started me on the path to writing like a lawyer; I can
only hope my writing has improved since 1L Intro to Lawyering. Thank you, all.
1
Global EV Outlook 2020, IEA (June 2020), https://www.iea.org/reports/globalev-outlook-2020.
2
See Earl J. Ritchie, What’s Happened To US Electric Vehicle Sales?, FORBES,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/uhenergy/2019/11/18/whats-happened-to-us-electricvehicle-sales/#291f7d577909 (last visited Jan. 30, 2022) for a discussion on the
growth of EV sales, and Alt. Fuels Data Ctr., Emissions from Hybrid and Plug-In
AFDC.ENERGY.GOV,
https://afdc.energy.gov/vehicles/
Electric
Vehicles,
electric_emissions.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2022) for a discussion on the
environmental impact of electric vehicles.
3
Timeline: History of the Electric Car, ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov
/timeline/timeline-history-electric-car (last visited Jan. 30, 2022).
4 For example, Tesla sold 192,250 EVs in 2019, the next closest manufacturer,
Chevrolet, sold 16,418 EVs the same year. Isabel Wagner, Estimated U.S. Battery
439
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In addition to competing with heritage manufacturers, Tesla
is a different kind of automaker in two significant respects. First,
whereas traditional manufacturers spend massive sums of money
to defend their patents, Tesla is committed to the “advancement
of electric vehicle technology” through the open-source
movement. 5 This commitment to the open-source movement
means that Tesla will not “initiate patent lawsuits against anyone
whom, in good faith, wants to use [its] technology.” 6 Second,
whereas traditional car sales are two-step transactions (a
manufacturer sells to a dealer who then sells to the consumer),
Tesla exclusively practices direct-to-consumer sales. 7 In pursuing
this direct-to-consumer strategy, Tesla conducts sales over the
internet and through “galleries.” 8 This direct-to-consumer model
has spawned considerable litigation and forceful lobbying efforts
in which Tesla has clashed with traditional dealers and
manufacturers. 9 This Comment seeks to shed light on these “Tesla
Electric

Vehicle
Sales
in
2019,
By
Brand,
STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/698414/sales-of-all-electric-vehicles-in-the-us-bybrand/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2022). It is important to note, however, that many
heritage makers expect to exclusively sell EVs by some fixed date in the future. See,
e.g., Jim Motavalli, Every Automaker’s EV Plans Through 2035 and Beyond, FORBES,
https://www.forbes.com/wheels/news/automaker-ev-plans/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2022)
(“[General Motors] plans to stop selling gas and diesel vehicles by 2035”).
5 Compare Bill Robinson, The Future of High Tech Patent Litigation in the Auto
Industry, AUTOMOTIVEWORLD, https://www.automotiveworld.com/articles/futurehigh-tech-patent-litigation-auto-industry/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2022) (describing the
frequency and scope of patent litigation in the auto industry), with Elon Musk, All
Our Patent Are Belong To You, TESLA BLOG (June 12, 2014),
https://www.tesla.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you (explaining that Tesla will
not pursue patent litigation against “good faith” users of its technology).
6 Musk, supra, note 5; but see Nicholas Collura, A Closer Look at Tesla’s OpenSource
Patent
Pledge,
LEXOLOGY,
https://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=ca6c332f-2cc5-401b-b80d-36473d0754c7 (last visited March 8, 2022)
(discussing the limitations of Tesla’s open-source policy).
7
Mohit Gupta & Neeraj Maurya, Tesla’s Direct to Consumer Retail Model,
INGENIOUS E-BRAIN, https://www.iebrain.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Tesladirect-Retail.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2022).
8
TESLA, https://www.tesla.com/models/design#payment (last visited Jan. 30,
2022). Tesla’s website allows consumers to customize their vehicle before proceeding
to a “checkout” screen, similar to that used by sellers of consumer-packaged goods.
Id. But for state laws forbidding the practice, this website would allow customers to
buy and receive a Tesla without ever having to leave their home to visit a dealer,
showroom, or gallery.
9
Cf. Lora Koldony, Tesla Launches Social Platform to Spur Owners to Take
Political Action on Its Behalf, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/05/tesla-engage-
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Wars.”
More specifically, this Comment will explore dealer
protection laws—laws originally passed to protect dealers from
manufacturers—but will focus on Michigan’s dealer protection
scheme. Michigan is unique among the states because it is home
to Detroit, the “Motor City,” Which houses the “Big Three”
American car manufacturers. 10 Because of this, Michigan is
perhaps the most important battleground of the Tesla Wars. Part
II of this Comment will overview the history of dealer protection
laws with a focus on the language and relevant history of
Michigan’s Motor Vehicle Franchise Act (“MVFA”). Part III
explores Tesla’s legal skirmishes in Michigan so far: its lawsuit
challenging the MVFA, the settlement that it produced, and the
legislative actions that followed. Part IV examines the merits of
Tesla’s Michigan lawsuit.
Overall, this Comment aims to contribute to the greater
conversation surrounding dealer protection laws and forecast how
future litigants—both in Michigan and elsewhere—might
challenge these regimes and win the opportunity to sell direct-toconsumer. Although Michigan and Tesla reached a settlement, it
is still worthwhile to analyze the substance of the Tesla suit for
several reasons. First, every state has some species of dealer
protection laws on the books. 11 Although Tesla may sell direct-toconsumer in Michigan, similar battles are bound to erupt
elsewhere, future litigants will likely advance similar arguments,
and legislators ought to draft laws that avoid constitutional doubt. 12
Second, although this settlement works uniquely in Tesla’s favor,
other companies in Michigan have not been so fortunate. 13 Thus,
asks-owners-to-take-political-action-on-companys-behalf.html (last visited March 8,
2022) (“[Tesla] is urging residents to push state legislators to change laws that bar
Tesla and others from selling vehicles directly to consumers. . . . They have even
provided a quick way for fans to submit public comments on legislation . . . or to
contact the appropriate committee members.”).
10
“Big Three” refers to Fiat-Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors. Elizabeth
Blessing,
Big
Three
Automakers,
INVESTOPEDIA
(Jan.
13,
2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bigthree.asp.
11
See generally Franchise Laws: By State, DEALER NEWS,
https://www.dealernews.com/DN-Academy/Management/post/franchise-laws-bystate/2016-11-29 (last visited Jan. 30, 2022) [hereinafter DEALER NEWS].
12 See discussion infra Part II.A.
13
Gabrielle Coppola, Rivian Faces Ban From Michigan Car Dealers in Direct-
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although Tesla managed to secure a fragile “win,” the substantive
problems in Michigan still loom large. Third, since the settlement,
Michigan lawmakers have proposed legislation that would “close
the door” behind Tesla in an attempt to prevent other
manufacturers from seeking similar accommodations. 14 Further,
several Michigan lawmakers have expressed support for a bill that
would renege on the Tesla settlement itself. 15 Accordingly, it is
worthwhile to scrutinize such laws, both to understand their effects
in the Wolverine State and on the national market for direct-toconsumer EV sales.
II.

DEALER PROTECTION LAWS

A. Dealer Protection Laws Generally
Although many EV makers would like to sell direct-toconsumer, every state has some law that either restricts or utterly
prohibits such sales. 16 While this Comment analyzes the history
and legal merit of state dealer franchise laws, it does not speculate
on their social utility. Regardless of whether one is a staunch
supporter or opponent of dealer protection laws, it is important to
understand the historical context in which these laws were passed
to have an informed opinion on either side of the debate.
In the early days of the American auto industry,
manufacturers sold directly to consumers. 17 At the time, there
were relatively few automakers in the United States, and what
manufacturers did exist lacked the requisite capital to build pure
production facilities. 18 With manufacturers spreading scarce
Sales

Fight, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-0921/rivian-faces-ban-from-michigan-car-dealers-in-direct-sales-fight?sref=voktyKaT
(last visited Jan. 30, 2022).
14
Fred Lambert, Michigan Is Closing the Door Behind Tesla on Direct Sale,
Leaving Rivian, Lucid, and More Behind, ELECTREK (Sept. 22, 2020, 6:08 AM),
https://electrek.co/2020/09/22/michigan-closing-door-behind-tesla-direct-saleleaving-rivian-lucid/.
15
See generally H.B. 6233, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2019),
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2019-2020/billintroduced/House/pdf/2020HIB-6233.pdf.
16 See generally DEALER NEWS, supra , note 11.
17 Gary M. Brown, State Motor Vehicle Franchise Legislation: A Survey and Due
Process Challenge to Board Composition , 33 VAND. L. REV. 385, 387 (1980).
18

Id.
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resources across both production and distribution, both aspects of
the auto market suffered. 19
Sales departments have long
recognized that consumers demand exceptional customer service;
potential customers demand a heightened degree of service in
order to embrace an unfamiliar technology. 20 At a time when cars
were a novel technology, consumers sought guidance in making
their purchases—more guidance than a single entity
(manufacturer-seller) could provide. 21 In response, manufacturers
developed “independent distribution systems,” selling cars to
independent franchisees (dealerships), who sold these cars to
customers. 22 Early franchise agreements typically designated the
franchisee-dealer as an “exclusive agent” of the manufacturer. 23
This principal-agent relationship exposed manufacturers to
significant liability because manufacturers could not meaningfully
supervise and control their dealer-agents. 24 Manufacturers of the
time were routinely sued (being deep-pocketed institutional
entities in contrast to “mom and pop” dealers) for the unilateral
and downstream acts of dealer-agents. 25 To insulate themselves
from this newfound liability, manufacturers sought to avoid
creating an agency relationship by designating franchisees as mere
“vendees,” rather than “agents.” 26 These attempts proved largely
unsuccessful. 27
Having failed to limit liability through principles of agency,
manufacturers sought to limit their liability by flexing their

19 Id. at 387 (“The consumer demanded services that the manufacturer was not
in a position to render.”).
20
See generally COMM. ON OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO ELECTRIC-VEHICLE
DEPLOYMENT ET AL., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES,
OVERCOMING BARRIER TO DEPLOYMENT OF PLUG-IN ELECTRIC VEHICLES 37–46 (2015),
https://www.nap.edu/read/21725/chapter/5.
21 Brown, supra note 17, at 387.
22 Brown, supra note 17, at 387.
23 Brown, supra note 17, at 387.
24 Brown, supra note 17, at 387.
25 See, e.g., Joslyn v. Cadillac Auto Co., 177 F. 863 (6th Cir. 1910) (lawsuit against
manufacturer for misrepresentation); Columbia Motors Co. v. Williams, 96 So. 900
(Ala. 1923) (lawsuit against manufacturer for breach of warranty).
26 See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (N.Y. 1916) (refusing
to apply the traditional “privity” test to hold a dealer liable, and instead applying a
foreseeability test).
27

Id.
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superior bargaining positions. 28 For the most part, franchise
agreements of the time were drafted by the manufacturer’s
lawyer. 29 These contracts inadequately defined the rights and
duties of the parties, and stipulated terms that favored
manufacturers. 30 Especially problematic for dealers of the time
were: (1) the manufacturer’s ability to “force” dealerships to
purchase inventory during times of low demand; (2) threats to
terminate franchise agreements at will; and (3) the manufacturer’s
unfettered right to compete with their own franchisees. 31
When dealers tried to challenge these contracts of adhesion in
court, they found little success based on the common law of
contracts. 32 In addition to troubles in court, dealer appeals to
Congress likewise fell flat as the Supreme Court struck down New
Deal legislation that might have mitigated the situation. 33 Today,
most dealer protection occurs at the state level. 34

Brown, supra note 17, at 388.
Brown, supra note 17, at 388 n.28.
30 Brown, supra note 17, at 388. These agreements often allowed manufacturers
to set sales quotas for dealers and terminate the franchise at will. Because opening
and running a dealership require substantial investment, and manufacturers could
terminate the agreement at will, dealers often purchased more cars than they could
sell at a given time, simply to avoid the manufacturer terminating the agreement at
a substantial loss to the dealer. See id.
31
For example, in 1921, Ford Motor Company had about $70 million in
liabilities come due. Unfortunately for Ford, these liabilities came due in the midst
of a recession which stifled demand for new cars and reduced prices nationwide. To
make ends meet, Ford flexed its ability to enforce minimum quotas on dealers and
forced dealers to purchase more inventory than the market demanded. Such
predatory practices have been largely outlawed and modern statutory regimes seek
to ensure fairness in business transactions between related parties. See generally
STEWART MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BALANCE OF POWER: THE AUTOMOBILE
MANUFACTURERS AND THEIR DEALERS 13 (Russell Sage Found. 1966).
32 See, e.g., Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 116 F.2d 675, 677
(2d Cir. 1940).
33 See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 553
(1935) (striking down part of the National Industrial Recovery Act 48 Stat. 195
(1933)); but see John H. Pavloff, Hope Yet for the Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court
Act: Marquis v. Chrysler Corp., 1979 DUKE L. J. 1185, 1185 (1979) (“The Automobile
Dealers’ Day in Court Act . . . enacted in 1956 created a new cause of action for
automobile dealers . . . to sue manufacturers in federal court for damages caused by
the manufacturers’ failure to act in ‘good faith’ in complying with terms of franchise
agreements, or in terminating or not renewing their dealers’ franchises.”).
34 See DEALER NEWS, supra note 11.
28
29
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B. Michigan’s Dealer Protection Law and Tesla’s Reasonable

Reading

Michigan enacted its first substantial dealer protection law,
the MVFA, in 1981. 35 Of the law’s many provisions, relevant to the
Michigan litigation was Section 445.1574 and the amendments
that followed. Section 445.1574 originally provided that “[a]
manufacturer, importer, or distributor shall not . . . [s]ell any new
motor vehicle directly to a retail customer other than through its
franchised dealers.” 36 As originally written, this law would have
allowed Tesla to sell direct-to-consumer. The possessive “its”
should be read as limiting Section 445.1574’s prohibition on
direct-to-consumer sales to those manufacturers which have
franchised dealers. 37 Tesla does not have any franchised dealers,
such that the MVFA would not have precluded its direct-toconsumer sales. This was Tesla’s position in the Michigan
lawsuit. 38 As will be addressed below, this result stems from a fair
reading of the statute, is consistent with the conclusions of other
courts facing similar laws, and follows logically from the historical
backdrop against which dealer protection laws have emerged.
Because dealer protection laws arose at a time when franchised
dealers were the victims of manufacturers, it would make little
sense for the law to protect franchisees who do not exist from
manufacturers who, a priori, can neither compete with, nor harm
them. 39
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 445, Refs & Annos.
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 445.1574.
37
Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶ 33, Tesla Motors, Inc. v.
Johnson, 1:16-cv-01158 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2016) (“[b]y using the possessive ‘its,’
the legislature limited the direct-sale prohibition to manufacturers that actually had
franchised dealers.”); see ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 107, 140 (2012) (discussing the negativeimplication canon and grammar cannons of construction).
38 Compl., supra note 37, at ¶ 33; Elon Musk (@elonmusk), TWITTER (Aug. 23,
2017,
5:16
PM),
https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/900466867659198464?
lang=en.
39 Indeed, dealer protection laws, at the outset, were enacted to protect dealers
from manufacturers. Will Zerhouni, Tesla Takes on Michigan (Cato Inst., Policy
Analysis No. 834, 2018), https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/tesla-takesmichigan, explaining that
as cars became more plentiful and demand began to flatten in the
1920’s, most manufacturers likewise turned to the dealership
model as the primary means of distribution . . . and demand35
36
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Even if Tesla could have sold direct-to-consumer under the
original MVFA, the law was amended as part of a larger bill, H.B.
5606, to remove the word “its.” 40 The bill itself is largely
unimportant for purposes of this Comment, but the amendment
potentially changed the entire meaning of Section 445.1574. 41 As
amended, the law reads “[a] manufacturer shall not . . . [s]ell any
new motor vehicle directly to a retail customer other than through
its franchised dealers.” 42
Michigan is not alone in passing a law to protect dealers from
their brand manufacturers and Tesla is not alone in reading such
statutes as limited to manufacturers with franchised dealers.
Indeed, Tesla was a party to a similar case in Massachusetts where
the Supreme Judicial Court offered an analogous reading of a
Massachusetts dealer protection law. In State Auto Dealers Ass’n,
Inc. v. Tesla Motors MA, Inc., 43 a group of car dealers brought an
action to enforce a Massachusetts law making it unlawful for a
manufacturer to “own or operate, either directly or indirectly . . .
a motor vehicle dealership located in the commonwealth of the
same line make as any of the vehicles manufactured, assembled or
distributed by the manufacturer or distributor.” 44 The statute also
created “a private right of action for dealers injured by statutory
violations.” 45 At the time, Tesla’s wholly-owned subsidiary, Tesla
Motors MA, operated a “gallery,” similar to that which the

creation bec[ame] critically important. . . . [Dealers] feared that
manufacturers would . . . open company dealerships in their
territory, competing with them directly . . . in response, the dealers
banded together and lobbied their state legislatures for protection.
40 2014 Mich. Legis. Serv. P.A. 354 (H.B. 5606).
41 Cf. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 37, at 56 (“When deciding an issue governed
by the text of a legal instrument, the careful lawyer or judge trusts neither memory
nor paraphrase but examines the very words of the instrument. As Justinian’s Digest
put it: A verbis legis non est recedendum (‘Do not depart from the words of the
law’)”).
42 Compare Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 445.1574 (effective Aug. 4, 2010 to Oct.
20, 2014), with Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 445.1574 (effective Oct. 21, 2014 to Mar.
27, 2019) (strikethrough maintained for emphasis).
43
Massachusetts State Auto. Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. Tesla Motors MA, Inc., 15
N.E.3d 1152, 1156 (2014).
44 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93B, § 4 (2021).
45
Mass. St. Auto. Dealers Ass’n, 15 N.E.3d at 1156; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93B,
§ 15(a)(2021).

STEWART (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

5/18/2022 7:58 PM

COMMENT

447

Michigan settlement purports to allow. 46 The Massachusetts State
Automobile Dealers Association, Inc. (“MSADA”) and two
Massachusetts auto dealers brought suit under the private right of
action created by chapter 93B, Section 15(a) of the Massachusetts
General Laws, seeking declaratory relief, a temporary restraining
order, and injunctive relief to prevent Tesla from owning the
“gallery” in Massachusetts. 47 Although the court dismissed the case
for lack of standing, it first questioned whether the law even
applied to Tesla. 48 Because chapter 93B, Section 4(c)(10)
prohibited manufacturers from owning or operating a dealership
in Massachusetts, the court questioned whether Tesla was indeed
operating a “motor vehicle dealership.” 49 Chapter 93B of
Massachusetts General Law, Section 1 defines “dealer,” “motor
vehicle dealer,” and “dealership” as a person who “in the ordinary
course of its business, is engaged in . . . selling new motor vehicles
to consumers . . . pursuant to a franchise agreement.” 50 Because
neither Tesla nor Tesla Motors MA was engaged in selling new
automobiles pursuant to a franchise agreement, the court was
unsure whether the statute applied to Tesla at all. 51 The court
concluded that the statute was “intended and understood only to
prohibit manufacturer-owned dealerships when, unlike Tesla, the
manufacturer already had an affiliated dealer or dealers in
Massachusetts.” 52 The court reasoned that the law was enacted to
“protect motor vehicle dealers from a host of unfair acts and
practices historically directed at them by their own brand
manufacturers and distributors,” and concluded that the law has
routinely been understood as protecting dealers from “having to
46
Joint Stipulation and Mot. for Entry of Dismissal ¶ e [hereinafter Joint
Stipulation]; Tesla, Inc. v. Benson, No. 1:16-cv-01158 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 22, 2020)
(“[no] provision of Michigan law prohibits Tesla from operating one or more
galleries in the State.”).
47 Mass. St. Auto. Dealers Ass’n, 15 N.E.3d at 1155.
48 Id. at 1157 (“although the parties do not address this point, it is not entirely
clear that the plain language of [the statute] applies to the defendants’ conduct and
renders it unlawful.”).
49

Id.

MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 93B, § 1 (2021) (defining “dealer,” “motor vehicle
dealer,” and “dealership”).
51 Mass. St. Auto. Dealers Ass’n, 15 N.E.3d at 1157 (questioning if Tesla MA was
a dealer, motor vehicle dealer, or dealership engaged in a franchise agreement).
52 Id. at 1162.
50

STEWART (DO NOT DELETE)

448

5/18/2022 7:58 PM

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 46:2

compete with their affiliated manufacturers for sales within a
defined geographical area.” 53
Although the Massachusetts decision has no binding effect in
Michigan, the two laws share a common history, and the
Massachusetts court’s reasoning lends support to Tesla’s
interpretation of Section 445.1574, before and after its
amendments.
III.

THE TESLA SUIT AND SETTLEMENT

In 2016, Tesla formally filed its complaint, challenging the
MVFA as amended by HB 5606. 54 Tesla argued that the
amendment changed the meaning of the MVFA as to render
Section 445.1574 unconstitutional. 55 Whereas the original law
suggested that Section 445.1574 would preclude only those
manufacturers with franchised dealers from selling directly to
consumers—allowing Tesla and similarly integrated companies to
do so—the amended law seemed to prohibit all manufacturers
from selling direct-to-consumer.
Tesla took further issue with the procedural backdrop against
which this amendment was passed. This amendment was not the
product of significant deliberation by the Michigan legislature, but
rather, it was added to a larger bill less than forty-eight hours
before being passed. 56 Indeed, Michigan lawmakers claim to have
been unaware of the amendment’s “anti-Tesla” bend as the full bill
containing the amendment was initially crafted to “determine
whether automakers could stop affiliated franchised dealers from
charging customers certain types of fees.” 57 Still, the thenMichigan Senator who added the midnight amendment, Joe
Hune, is married to a registered lobbyist whose firm serves the

53
54
55
56

Id. at 1160.
See Compl., supra note 37.
Compl., supra note 37, at ¶ 50–64.
Zerhouni, supra note 39 (explaining “[t]he . . . amendment was added on

October 1, 2014, at the dusk of that year’s legislative session. . . . [and] passed without
comment or debate the next day.”).
57 Vince Bond, Anti-Tesla Bill Reaches Michigan Governor’s Desk, AUTOMOTIVE
NEWS
(Oct.
15,
2014),
https://www.autonews.com/
article/20141015/RETAIL07/141019925/anti-tesla-bill-reaches-michigan-governors-desk).
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Auto Dealers of Michigan. 58 Before the settlement was reached,
U.S. Magistrate Judge Ellen Carmody denied bids by Hune and
other legislators to quash Tesla subpoenas seeking to gather
information regarding the legislators’ involvement with the
Detroit auto industry. 59 While the discovery materials are largely
confidential between the then-litigants, Tesla further alleged
animus from specific Michigan legislators. 60
In early 2020, Tesla settled the lawsuit and celebrated it as a
“win.” 61 The settlement purported to allow Tesla to sell direct-toconsumer by clarifying that existing law does not prohibit whollyowned Tesla subsidiaries from “owning or operating one or more
service or repair facilities” or “performing warranty, recall, service,
or repair work.” 62 The settlement further clarified that existing
Michigan law does not prohibit Tesla from “delivering vehicles to
Michigan residents in Michigan (whether directly, through a
subsidiary, using an independent carrier, or otherwise) . . . so long
as legal title for any vehicles sold by Tesla transfers outside the
state of Michigan.” 63 Lastly, the settlement allows Tesla to open
“galleries” in Michigan that perform essentially the same function
as traditional dealerships, so long as the directly owned galleries
do not, themselves, transfer legal title to vehicles. 64 The galleries
could also perform other traditional functions of a dealer, such as
conducting test drives and discussing prices, but they may only
“facilitat[e] ordering and purchase of a vehicle for which legal title
transfers out-of-state.” 65 It is important to note that this settlement
was enacted under the Michigan Department of State’s authority
Paul Egan, Federal Judge In Tesla Case: Lawmakers Must Turn Over Records
Automaker, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Aug. 21, 2017),
https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2017/08/21/tesla-lawsuitsubpoenas-lawmaker-records-hune-sheppard/586676001; Marcia Hune, GSCI,
https://www.gcsionline.com/the-gcsi-edge/marcia-hune/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2022).
59 Egan, supra note 58.
60
See Zerhouni, supra note 39 (quoting Michigan state legislator, Jason
Sheppard as saying, “[t]he Michigan dealers do not want you here. The local
manufacturers do not want you here. So you’re not going to be here.”).
61
Elon Musk (@elonmusk), TWITTER (Jan. 21, 2020, 6:30 PM),
https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1219764212278464512.
62 Joint Stipulation, supra note 46, at ¶ b.
63 Joint Stipulation, supra note 46, at ¶ c.
64 Joint Stipulation, supra note 46, at ¶ e.
65 Joint Stipulation, supra note 46, at ¶ e.
58

To

Electric
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to administer and enforce Section 445.1501 et seq., and M.C.L.
Section 257.1. 66 Thus, this settlement does not actually alter,
overrule, or abridge the statutes themselves. For practical
purposes, it is more proper to regard the settlement as an
agreement to not enforce Section 445.1574 as written against
Tesla. 67 Indeed, the settlement ends in a “covenant” to only
enforce Michigan law against Tesla in accordance with the terms
of the settlement and to take no enforcement action that is
inconsistent with the interpretation of law set forth in the
settlement. 68 The covenant ends with the defendants stating that
the interpretations of the law set forth in the settlement are not
policy choices, but are simply an “objective” reading of the
statute. 69 Thus, the settlement did not actually change the law—it
merely codified one interpretation as to Tesla. As of this
publication, the law as written is still utterly enforceable as to all
parties but “Tesla and its subsidiary or successor.” 70
Although the settlement has the practical effect of allowing
Tesla to sell vehicles directly to consumers (establishing a whollyowned subsidiary to transfer title out-of-state is a relatively easy
task for a large corporation), this “loophole,” by its own terms,
applies only to Tesla. 71 Because Tesla is the lone beneficiary of this
settlement, the legal community has no clear guidance from the
courts with respect to Tesla’s substantive constitutional challenges.
The remainder of this Comment seeks to shine light on the merits
of these claims, had the suit gone forward.
Despite the settlement, the Tesla Wars are still raging behind
closed doors in Lansing.
In September 2020, Michigan
Representative Jason Sheppard introduced legislation, HB 6233, 72
that would “shut the door” behind Tesla, allowing the Palo Alto
manufacturer to be the sole manufacturer-dealer in the state. 73 HB
6233 would have amended the MVFA to add a section exempting
Tesla from the statute’s otherwise broad prohibition on direct-to66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Joint Stipulation, supra note 46, at ¶ a.
Joint Stipulation, supra note 46, at ¶ b.
Joint Stipulation, supra note 46, at ¶ b.
Joint Stipulation, supra note 46, at ¶ c.
Joint Stipulation, supra note 46, at ¶ b.
Joint Stipulation, supra note 46, at ¶ a.
H.B. 6233, supra note 15.
See Lambert, supra note 14.
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consumer sales. Indeed, the bill would have amended Section
445.1574 to read in relevant part:

[E]xcept as otherwise provided under [S]ection 17d.
a manufacturer shall not do any of the following: . .
. (h) Directly or indirectly own, operate, or control
a new motor vehicle dealer . . . [or] (i) Sell any new
motor vehicle directly to a retail customer other
than through franchised dealers. 74
The new section, Section 17d, would have established two
conditions for a manufacturer being allowed to:
(a) own a subsidiary that owns or operates . . . repair
facilities . . . (b) Perform warranty, recall, service, or
repair work . . . (c) Deliver new motor vehicles to
residents [of Michigan] either directly or through a
subsidiary . . . as long as the sale and passing of title
for any new motor vehicle sold by the manufacturer
are transferred to the buyer outside of [Michigan] .
. . [and] (d) Own or operate . . . facilities in
[Michigan] that educate customers and facilitate
transactions. 75
The two conditions that must be met for Section 17d to apply
are: (1) the “manufacturer [must have] entered into a joint
stipulation and motion for entry of dismissal on January 22, 2020,
in Tesla, Inc. v. Jocelyn Benson, et al”; and (2) the manufacturer
[must] have “not sold a single new motor vehicle through any
franchised new motor vehicle dealer [in Michigan].” 76 Because
Tesla is the only manufacturer that entered into the joint
stipulation and motion for entry of dismissal on January 22, 2020,
in Tesla, Inc. v. Jocelyn Benson, et al, it is the only manufacturer
to whom Section 17d’s exemptions from Section 445.1574 would
apply.
74
75
76

H.B. 6233, supra, note 15 (new language in italic).
H.B. 6233, supra, note 15, at § 17d.
H.B. 6233, supra, note 15.
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On December 2, 2020, HB 6233 was significantly altered
before being passed by the Michigan House to remove the Tesla
carveout in what has been described as a feat of “impressive
political backstabbing.” 77 While HB 6233 has not passed the
Michigan Senate and been signed into law, it has the potential to
close the very loophole that Tesla v. Johnson opened and the
original HB 6233 sought to preserve. Thus, if the current version
of HB 6233 ever becomes law—banning all direct-to-consumer
auto sales—EV makers such as Rivian and Lucid (who were not
parties to the settlement), may find an ally in the fight for directto-consumer auto sales in the Wolverine State: Tesla, Inc.
IV.

SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENTS AGAINST DEALER
PROTECTION LAWS

In its complaint, Tesla raised three grounds on which the
amended Section 445.1574 violated its constitutional rights: (1)
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3)
the Commerce Clause of Article I. 78 This Comment will overview
the viability of the Equal Protection and Commerce Clause
challenges. The due process theory is beyond the scope of this
paper.

77 H.B. 6233, supra, note 15 (removing the Tesla carveout from Representative
Sheppard’s original bill); Fred Lambert, Tesla Loophole for Direct Sales in Michigan
is Getting Shut with Impressive Political Backstabbing, ELECTREK (Dec. 3, 2020, 12:35
PM),
https://electrek.co/2020/12/03/tesla-loophole-direct-sales-in-michigan-isgetting-shut-political-backstabbing/.
78 Compl., supra, note 37, at ¶ 50–64.
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A. Equal Protection
Tesla alleged that the amended MVFA violated its Fourteenth
Amendment right to equal protection. 79 Tesla claimed that
Michigan unlawfully distinguished between entities in two ways:
first, “between (a) manufacturer-owned dealerships, such as Tesla,
and (b) franchised dealerships that are not owned by
manufacturers, which are similarly situated in all material
respects”; and second, “between (a) non-Michigan based
manufacturers like Tesla, which do not use franchised dealerships
as part of their sales model, and (b) Michigan-based manufacturers
like General Motors, which do.” 80 Tesla claimed that Michigan
had no legitimate purpose for such differential treatment and that
the “irrational” classifications “exist solely for the purpose of
protecting two discrete Michigan-based interest groups—
Michigan’s franchised auto dealers and Michigan-based
manufacturers—from economic competition.” 81
Generally, when a law is challenged on equal protection
grounds, the law is only subjected to “rational basis” review. 82 A
law will be subject to heightened review, either strict or
intermediate scrutiny, 83 if it discriminates against a suspect or

Compl., supra, note 37, at ¶ 54.
Compl., supra, note 37, at ¶ 56.
81 Compl., supra, note 37, at ¶ 56.
82
But see United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)
(“There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution”); Loesel v. City of Frankenmuth, 692 F.3d 452, 461 (6th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Rondigo, L.L.C. v. Twp. of Richmond, 641 F.3d 673, 681–82 (6th Cir.
2011)) (“The Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination by government which
either burdens a fundamental right, targets a suspect class, or intentionally treats one
differently than others similarly situated without any rational basis for the
difference.”).
83 See Nancy M. Reininger, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center: Rational
Basis with a Bite, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 927 (1986) (discussing varying degrees of scrutiny
in detail).
79
80
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quasi-suspect classification 84 or abridges a “fundamental” right.85
If a law does not discriminate against such classifications or
abridge fundamental rights, it is subject to rational basis review. 86
Under rational basis review, a law will be upheld so long as it bears
some rational relationship to a legitimate government purpose. 87
The challenger bears the burden of proving that the law either
furthers no conceivable legitimate government purpose or that the
means chosen to pursue such purpose are not rationally related to
the purpose itself. 88
Here, there appear to be a few alternatives regarding Tesla’s
equal protection challenge to Section 445.1574.
Before
addressing the viable theories, we can rule out a few entirely. First
and foremost, Tesla is a corporation, and even assuming that it is
being “discriminated against,” it does not belong to a suspect or
quasi-suspect class. Thus, Tesla’s only hope for review under strict
or intermediate scrutiny rests on the law at issue infringing upon
one of its fundamental rights. There seems to be no fundamental
right implicated here. 89 Thus, Section 445.1574 would likely be
subject to rational basis review. 90 To prevail under this standard,
Tesla will need to establish that it, or the non-suspect class to which
it belongs, is indeed being treated differently from similarly
84 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (explaining suspect
classifications) (“classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or
race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny”); Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (explaining quasi-suspect classifications)
(“the party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their
gender must carry the burden of showing an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for
the classification”).
85
Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. at 153 (“There may be narrower scope for
operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face
to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution.”).
86 See Reininger, supra, note 83.
87 See Reininger, supra note 83 (discussing “rational basis review” at length).
88 See Reininger, supra note 83.
89 See generally W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (interferences
with the “freedom of contract” are no longer subjected to strict scrutiny).
90 There is, however, precedent to suggest that the Court will apply heightened
review as it sees fit, notwithstanding the lack of “fundamental rights” or “suspect”
classifications being implicated. The Court has said that it would “not be faithful to
[its] obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment if [it] applied so deferential a
standard to every classification.” See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)
(applying heightened scrutiny to a law that did not abridge fundamental rights or
discriminate against a suspect (or quasi-suspect) classification).
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situated entities and that the government lacks a legitimate
purpose for such disparate treatment. 91
Tesla did not claim to be part of a suspect or quasi-suspect
class, nor could it. It is also not obvious that Tesla belongs to any
“class” at all, given the lack of “manufacturer-owned” dealerships
in Michigan. 92 Indeed, Tesla seems to be putting forward that it
was discriminated against more than any “class.” 93 Thus, Tesla’s
argument evokes a “class of one” claim. The Supreme Court has
explained that a plaintiff may bring an equal protection claim,
notwithstanding lack of membership in any class, because the
Equal Protection Clause exists to “secure every person within the
State’s
jurisdiction
against
intentional
and
arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute
or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.” 94
The paradigm class of one claim is where: “(1) the plaintiff
alleges that he has been intentionally treated differently from
others similarly situated and (2) that there is no rational basis for
the difference in treatment or the cause of the differential
treatment is a ‘totally illegitimate animus’ toward the plaintiff by
the defendant.” 95

91
TriHealth, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 430 F.3d 783, 790 (6th Cir. 2005)
(“[D]isparate treatment of persons is reasonably justified if they are dissimilar in some
material respect.”).
92
See Compl., supra note 37, at ¶ 31. Tesla also alleged that the Detroit
manufacturers support Section 445.1574. See id.
93
Compl., supra note 37, at ¶ 31 (“Section 445.1574 and the Anti-Tesla
Amendment”).
94
Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (quoting Sioux City
Bridge Co. v. Dakota City., 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923)).
95
McDonald v. Vill. of Winnetka, 371 F.3d 992, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004); Vill. of
Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564 (holding for the plaintiff “where the plaintiff did not
allege membership in a class or group.”); see also Michael D. Bersani, “Class of One”
Equal Protection Claims: Confusion and Uncertainty Post Olech and Engquist, HCB
ATT’YS, http://www.hcbattorneys.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/13.-HCC-2012Class-of-One-Equal-Prot.-Claims.pdf (overviewing the approach various circuits take
to “class of one” claims).
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1. Similarly Situated

In the Sixth Circuit, where Tesla filed suit, a class of one
plaintiff must demonstrate that he was treated differently than
others “who were similarly situated in all material respects.” 96 To
be similarly situated, a plaintiff and those with whom he claims to
be similarly situated (“comparators”) need not be identical, and
not all differences between the plaintiff and his comparators are
material. 97 Thus, the relevant inquiry for the litigants would be the
degree to which manufacturer-dealers and franchised dealers are
similarly situated. Only after Tesla can establish that these two
groups are indeed “similarly situated” does it become relevant that
the two groups are being treated differently such that the
government must have a basis for the disparity. 98 The question of
whether a plaintiff and comparator are similarly situated is
generally one for a jury, and thus a claim under this theory should
survive summary judgment. 99
Here, Tesla could make a
compelling case that manufacturer-dealers are similarly situated
to franchised dealers for the purposes of Section 445.1574. Given
that not all differences between a plaintiff and his comparators are
96

Loesel v. City of Frankenmuth, 692 F.3d 452, 462 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing

TriHealth, 430 F.3d at 790 (“Materiality is an integral element of the rational basis

inquiry. . . . [D]isparate treatment of persons is reasonably justified if they are
dissimilar in some material respect.”)); see also Schellenberg v. Twp. of Bingham,
436 F. App'x 587, 591 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that “plaintiffs must allege that they
and other individuals who were treated differently were similarly situated in all
material respects.”) (internal citations omitted).
97
Loesel, 692 F.3d at 463 (“[The City] has not explained how any differences
between the products to be sold by Wal-Mart and those sold by either Bronner's or
Kroger is relevant and material to the enactment of a size-cap and the equal
protection analysis.”).
98
TriHealth, 430 F.3d at 790 (“[D]isparate treatment of persons is reasonably
justified if they are dissimilar in some material respect.”).
99 Loesel, 692 F.3d at 463 (quoting Eggleston v. Bieluch, 203 F. App'x 257, 264
(11th Cir. 2006) (“[D]etermining whether individuals are similarly situated is
generally a factual issue for the jury.”). Summary judgment will be granted if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. An
issue of material fact is “genuine” only if premised on evidence upon which a
reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Hedrick v.
W. Rsrv. Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 451 (6th Cir. 2004). A fact in dispute is “material”
only if its resolution could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
substantive law. Id.
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material, the Sixth Circuit has given guidance as to what a jury
could reasonably find to be a material difference. 100 This guidance
indicates that the jury could find a difference immaterial (such that
an equal protection suit may continue), in light of the purpose the
statute purports to serve. 101
In Loesel v. City of Frankenmuth, the Loesel family
(“Loesels”) brought a class of one equal protection challenge
against a Michigan zoning ordinance precluding construction of
buildings over 65,000 square feet on their land, yet permitting
such buildings on other parcels. 102 The Loesels contracted to sell
their land to Wal-Mart, which planned to build a store on-site, but
the new city ordinance made it nearly impossible for Wal-Mart to
build. 103 As a result, the superstore backed out of the sale. 104 The
government attempted to justify the Loesels’ disparate treatment
by contending that the parcels were materially different because
the Loesels’ land was zoned differently from comparator parcels. 105
The Loesels’ parcel was zoned “CL-PUD,” a commercial
designation for developments that “provide principally for sale of
goods and services . . . including but not limited to grocery,
department drug, and hardware stores,” while the comparator’s
property was zoned “B-3,” a “highway commercial” designation. 106
The court ruled that a jury could have reasonably found the zoning
designation to be immaterial because both designations exist to
encourage commercial development and, but for the new
ordinance, both designations would have allowed for a Wal-Mart
to be built. 107 The court concluded that despite the parcel’s
differences, the fact that both zoning designations served the
purpose of encouraging commercial development was sufficient

100
101

See, e.g., Loesel , 692 F.3d at 462 (discussing Sixth Circuit case law).
Id. at 464 (“[A] jury could . . . have reasonably concluded that the difference

in ‘labels’ for these commercially zoned properties is not material.”).
102 Id. at 460–65.
103
104

Id.
Id. (“In light of the new size-cap ordinance, however, Wal-Mart declined to

continue with the approval process and . . . informed the Loesels that it intended to
terminate the purchase agreement pursuant to the ‘feasibility’ clause.”).
105 Id. at 463.
106 Loesel, 692 F.3d at 456–57.
107 Id. at 464 (“As part of the City's Plan, however, the promotion of commercial
development is encouraged on the CL-PUD properties.”).

STEWART (DO NOT DELETE)

458

5/18/2022 7:58 PM

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 46:2

for a jury to find the difference immaterial. 108 Thus, the difference
that may have been material was not the label affixed to each
zoning designation but the purpose of the designations—
something common among the Loesels and their comparators.
Just as the parcels in Loesel were indeed “different” (in zoning
designation), so too are manufacturer-dealers and franchised
dealers different (in ownership status). Per Loesel, this distinction
is not fatal, lest it be deemed “material.” 109 Tesla alleged that
manufacturer-dealers are similarly situated to franchisee-dealers
“in all material respects.” 110 Whereas the Loesel court would have
permitted a jury to find the zoning designation immaterial,
considering that the two designations served the same purpose (to
encourage commercial development), a reasonable jury could have
found the difference between manufacturer-owned dealers and
franchised dealers immaterial in light of the purpose of the MVFA.
Given that the MVFA was designed to protect franchisees from
manufacturers, and a manufacturer without franchisees cannot
harm its franchisees, the difference between independent
dealerships and manufacturer-owned dealerships seems to be
immaterial—or at the very least raises a question for a jury.
Having established that a jury could regard the manufacturerowned versus franchisee-owned distinction as immaterial, the rest
of the inquiry concerns the government’s justification for treating
the similarly situated parties differently.
2. Rational Basis
In the Sixth Circuit, “[a] ‘class of one’ plaintiff may
demonstrate that a government action lacks a rational basis in one
of two ways: either by ‘negativ[ing] every conceivable basis which
might support’ the government action, or by demonstrating that
the challenged government action was motivated by animus or illwill.” 111 The government “has no obligation to produce evidence
108
Id. (“[A] jury could . . . have reasonably concluded that the difference in
‘labels’ for these commercially zoned properties is not material.”).
109 Id. at 462 (explaining that materially different persons need not be treated
the same).
110 Compl., supra note 37, at ¶ 56.
111 Warren v. City of Athens, 411 F.3d 697, 711 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Klimik
v. Kent Cnty. Sheriff's Dep’t., 91 F. App'x 396, 400 (6th Cir. 2004)).
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to sustain the rationality of its action; its choice is presumptively
valid and ‘may be based on rational speculation unsupported by
evidence or empirical data.’” 112 The government’s action will not
lack rational justification simply because it “is not made with
mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some
inequality.” 113 An equal protection claim will succeed only if the
government’s action is shown to be “irrational.” 114 “Negativing”
every conceivable basis for the government’s action is an incredibly
demanding standard for a plaintiff. 115
Rather than negating every conceivable basis that might
support the amended Section 445.1574, a challenger like Tesla
could assert a claim under the alternative theory that the law was
born of “animus or ill-will.” 116 The government does not
demonstrate the animus required under this theory merely
because it opposes a plaintiff’s business ambitions; rather, the
government must have expressed animus against the plaintiff,
personally. 117 A court will deduce the government’s objective from
“both direct and circumstantial evidence,” including, but not
limited to, the “historical background of the decision under
challenge,” the “events leading to the enactment or official policy
in question,” and the “legislative or administrative history,”
including contemporaneous statements made by members of the
decisionmaking body.” 118 All of these factors inform the question
of discriminatory object. 119 Further, the Supreme Court seems to
112
TriHealth, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 430 F.3d 783, 790–91 (6th Cir. 2005)
(quoting F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993)).
113 F.C.C. 508 U.S. at 316 n.7 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485
(1970)).
114 Warren, 411 F.3d at 710.
115 Loesel v. City of Frankenmuth, 692 F.3d 452, 461 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Class-ofone claims are generally viewed skeptically.”); TriHealth, 430 F.3d at 791 (describing
a class of one plaintiff’s burden as a “heavy” burden).
116
Id. at 467 (explaining that either a “no conceivable basis” or an “animus”
theory is sufficient to find for a plaintiff); see also Rondigo, L.L.C. v. Twp. of
Richmond, 641 F.3d 673, 682 (6th Cir. 2011).
117 Loesel, 692 F.3d at 467 (“Although the Loesels presented abundant evidence
showing that certain City officials, such as City Manager Graham, strongly opposed
having a Wal-Mart supercenter in Frankenmuth, the animus had to be directed
against the Loesels to be relevant to their claim.”).
118 Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68
(1977).
119 Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279, n. 24 (1979).
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exact laws born of animus to a more stringent form of rational basis
review. 120 Indeed, the Court has recognized a difference between
laws that incidentally burden a non-suspect class and laws that were
passed with the object of harming a non-suspect class. 121
Commentators have sometimes termed this “rational basis with
bite.” 122
Here, Tesla could point to the statements made by legislators
to support the inference that HB 5606 was passed with the purpose
of intentionally discriminating against Tesla and generating rents
for heritage manufacturers with an undeniable presence in
Michigan government. 123 This body of evidence, if properly
brought into court, suggests animus. This seems like a viable
strategy, and at the very least may allow Tesla to survive a motion
to dismiss. Future litigants would be wise to investigate the
government’s motive for passing such laws because these motives
inform the inquiry as to dormant commerce violations, equal
protection violations, and due process violations. 124

120 Compare City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450
(1985) (quoting the court of appeals, “[t]he City never justifies its apparent view that
other people can live under such ‘crowded’ conditions when mentally retarded
persons cannot”) (emphasis added), with Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348
U.S. 483, 487 (1955) (“[L]aw may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many
cases. But it is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and
disadvantages of the new requirement”) (emphasis added).
121 U. S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (“desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest”);
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (striking down a law under rational basis
review because the “immediate, continuing, and real injuries . . . outr[a]n and belie[d]
any legitimate justifications that may be claimed for it”).
122 See generally Reininger, supra note 83 (discussing “rational basis with bite”).
123
Zerhouni, supra, note 39 (quoting Representative Jason Sheppard in a
conversation with Tesla representatives: “the Michigan dealers do not want you here.
The local manufacturers do not want you here. So, you’re not going to be here.”).
124 But see SCALIA & GARNER, supra, note 37 at 56 (“the purpose must be derived
from the text, not from extrinsic sources such as legislative history or an assumption
about the legal drafter’s desires”).
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B. Commerce Clause
Tesla alleged that Section 445.1574 violates the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution. 125 Article I empowers
Congress to regulate interstate commerce. 126 From this grant of
power, the Supreme Court has conceived that Congress alone may
enact laws with the effect of interfering with interstate commerce
and that states may not do so. 127 Thus, state laws that unduly
burden, discriminate against, or otherwise unduly interfere with
interstate commerce may violate the Constitution’s “dormant”
commerce clause. 128
In analyzing a case under the dormant commerce clause,
courts regard laws that facially discriminate against interstate
commerce with the utmost scrutiny, upholding such laws only if
the state seeks to further a compelling interest that cannot be
served by a less discriminatory means. 129 Indeed, such laws that
facially discriminate against interstate commerce are essentially
invalid per se. 130 Even if a law does not discriminate on its face, if
the avowed purpose or effect of the law is to discriminate against
interstate commerce, it will still be struck down unless an exception
applies or the law is necessary to protect a legitimate state
interest. 131
While nearly any benefit to a state is a “legitimate”
government interest, the Supreme Court has made clear that
economic protectionism is not a legitimate interest for the
purposes of the dormant commerce clause. 132 Thus, even if a law
substantially works to benefit the economy of a particular locale, if
Compl., supra, note 37, at ¶ 8.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
127 H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 538 (1949).
128 Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529 (1959) (striking down a
nondiscriminatory law for unduly burdening interstate commerce); Dean Milk Co. v.
City of Madison, Wis., 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (striking down a law for
discriminating against interstate commerce); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert.
Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 354 (1977) (striking down a law for unduly interfering with
interstate commerce).
129 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986); but see Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447
U.S. 429, 440 (1980) (explaining the “market participant” exception to the dormant
commerce clause).
130 City of Phila. v. N.J., 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
131 See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 354.
132 Dean Milk, 340 U.S. at 354.
125
126
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such benefit comes at the expense of interstate commerce, the law
is likely unconstitutional. 133
Even if a law does not discriminate on its face or in purpose
or effect, laws that incidentally burden interstate commerce may
be struck down if the putative local benefits of the law are
outweighed by the law’s burden on interstate commerce. 134 Thus,
depending on how the law is characterized, the litigant’s respective
burdens shift accordingly.
In the Michigan litigation, Tesla alleged that Section
445.1574: (1) discriminates against interstate commerce; (2) does
not serve a legitimate local interest; and (3) burdens interstate
commerce beyond “any conceivable local benefit.” 135 Although the
MVFA does not explicitly discriminate against interstate
commerce, the requirement that a manufacturer employ a
franchised dealer is not dissimilar to a “home processing
requirement.” A “home processing requirement” is a legal
requirement that commerce within a state, at some point, employ
a local business. 136 The Court routinely strikes down home
processing requirements as impermissibly discriminating against
interstate commerce. 137 This is because when a law forces those in
commerce to engage with in-state businesses as a prerequisite to
entering that state’s markets, that state has precluded an actor
from doing business with comparable out-of-state businesses to
accomplish the same task. 138
Indeed, this is essentially the argument Tesla raises in its
complaint. 139 This contention has some merit, but it may fall flat.
Indeed, there is nothing in Section 445.1574 that requires a
manufacturer to employ a Michigan franchised dealer; the
franchised dealer that a manufacturer sells through could be an
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 277 (1984).
Bibb, 359 U.S. at 529.
135 Compl., supra note 37, at ¶ 59–62.
136 See Dean Milk, 340 U.S. at 350–51.
137 See id. at 354 (striking down a Wisconsin ordinance mandating that all milk
to be sold in Madison, Wisconsin be pasteurized within five miles of the city).
138
Such forced engagement with in-state businesses could have been
engagement had with out-of-state businesses. See Wyo. v. Okla., 502 U.S. 437, 455
(1992) (holding that an Oklahoma law requiring 10% of a factory’s coal come from
Oklahoma violated the dormant commerce clause because forcing engagement with
local coal sellers discriminated against interstate commerce).
139 Compl., supra note 37, at ¶ 8.
133
134
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out-of-state business operating in Michigan. Typically, “home
processing requirements,” by the terms of the law itself, require
engagement with in-state business, such as by setting geographic
restrictions, granting monopolies to local businesses, or overtly
stating that some resource must be consumed in-state. 140 On its
face, Section 445.1574 does no such thing. Even if the law was
passed to protect Michigan’s franchised auto-dealers and
manufacturers, manufacturers can still employ non-Michigan
franchised dealers to sell their cars in Michigan. 141
Notwithstanding this lack of facial protectionism, if the MVFA
treats in-state and out-of-state interests differently, the dispositive
issue is whether the statute serves a legitimate state interest that
cannot otherwise be met. 142 Rather than being directly on par with
the “home processing” line of cases, perhaps this case falls more
in line with the cases concerning facially neutral laws with the
purpose or effect of safeguarding local interests at the expense of
interstate commerce. 143 Indeed, if the vast majority of car
dealerships in Michigan are owned by Michigan residents, such
that it is all but certain that working with a franchised dealer
guarantees that the dealer will be a Michigan entity, one could
argue that the law has the effect of forcing interactions with
Michigan businesses. 144 However, this argument is probably not a
140
Dean Milk, 340 U.S. at 356 (striking down a law that set geographic
restrictions); C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 394
(1994) (“State and local governments may not use their regulatory power to favor
local enterprise by prohibiting patronage of out-of-state competitors or their
facilities.”); Hughes v. Okla., 441 U.S. 322, 338 (1979) (striking down an Oklahoma
law prohibiting the shipment of minnows outside the state).
141 This, of course, raises the question—to what extent is there even a “legislative
intent”? For further discussion on this question, see, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra
note 37, at 376 (“There is no reason to believe . . . that a ‘legislative intent’ ever
existed.”).
142 McNeilus Truck & Mfg., Inc. v. Ohio ex rel. Montgomery, 226 F.3d 429, 442
(6th Cir. 2000) (“[when a] statute directly, in effect, or in purpose treats in-state and
out-of-state interests differently, the dispositive issue will become whether the statute
serves a legitimate state interest that cannot otherwise be met.”).
143
See, e.g., Minn. v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 472 (1981)
(upholding a Minnesota law that required all milk sold in the state be sold only in
paperboard containers, rather than plastic despite the law disproportionately
benefiting Minnesota’s robust paper industry and disproportionately burdening the
interstate plastics industry).
144 Compl., supra note 37, at ¶ 9 (alleging that the law’s “purpose is to protect
two discrete Michigan groups . . . franchised and manufacturers”).
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winning one, as the Court has rejected similar dormant commerce
clause challenges to state laws preventing manufacturers from
selling direct-to-consumer. 145
In Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, the Supreme Court
rejected a dormant commerce challenge to a Maryland statute
forbidding petroleum producers from operating retail stations
within the state. 146 Section 157E of the Maryland statute, for the
purposes of the dormant commerce clause, is strikingly similar to
Section 445.1574 both in effect and relevant history. Prior to
Section 157E, several petroleum producers owned and operated
service stations in Maryland, selling their products directly to
consumers. 147 Some producers sold exclusively through companyowned service stations, and some producers sold both to
independent stations and directly to consumers. 148 Moreover,
before the advent of dealer protection laws, car manufacturers
could sell cars directly to consumers. 149 Section 157E was passed
in response to a Maryland study that found petroleum producers
favored their own service stations over independently owned
stations such that independent stations could not compete during
the oil crisis. 150 The law was “designed to correct the inequities in
the distribution and pricing of gasoline [between producer-owned
and independent stations] reflected by the survey.” 151 As discussed
supra, Section 445.1574 was passed, at least in part, to protect
franchisees from manufacturers who could undercut dealer
prices. 152 Thus, the two laws are similar enough that Exxon likely
controls, or at the very least looms large over the Tesla litigation—
unless Tesla can meaningfully differentiate Section 445.1574 from
Section 157E.
This invites the question—on what grounds might Tesla
differentiate Section 157E and Section 445.1574? In Exxon, the
Court addressed Exxon’s contention that Section 157E
145
146
147
148
149
150
151

See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
Id. at 119–20 (1978).
Id. at 121–24.
Id. at 121.
Brown, supra note 17 at 387.
Exxon, 437 U.S. at 121.
Id. (citing Governor of Md. v. Exxon Corp., 370 A.2d 1102, 1109 (Md. Ct.

Spec. App. 1977)).
152 See supra Part II.
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discriminated against interstate commerce both as to the market
for gasoline production and the retail gasoline market. 153 The
Court was quick to dispense with the argument that Section 157E
discriminated against interstate producers and refiners in favor of
local refiners and producers because Maryland had no local
producers or refiners, and thus the law could not discriminate in
favor of nonexistent locals. 154 This is a point by which Tesla may
distinguish itself from Exxon. Whereas all petroleum consumed
in Maryland came from out-of-state, not all cars purchased in
Michigan come from out-of-state; Michigan actually produces cars.
This distinction matters in the sense that the Court in Exxon
dismissed Exxon’s claim of disparate treatment as “meritless”
because Maryland had no producers. 155 In the wake of Exxon and
its quick dismissal of the discriminates-against-interstateproducers-theory, the legal community has no clear guidance as to
what effect the presence of local producers has on a dormant
commerce clause challenge. Indeed, Tesla seemed poised to
resurrect the argument, but this go-around, the court would not
be able to dismiss the argument for want of local producers.
As to Tesla’s status in the market as a seller, Exxon again
provides guidance. Exxon argued that because all the producers
of petroleum (now forbidden from running a retail store by Section
157E) were out-of-state entities, the law discriminated against
interstate commerce at the retail level. 156 The Court rejected this
claim, holding that even though the burden of Section 157E fell
solely on interstate companies, “this fact does not lead, either
logically or as a practical matter, to a conclusion that the State is
discriminating against interstate commerce at the retail level.” 157
The Court explained that although the burdens of the law fell
exclusively on interstate companies, interstate commerce itself was
unlikely to be hampered by such asymmetric burdens. 158 In the
Tesla litigation, although Section 445.1574 prohibits Tesla from
selling direct-to-consumer, it does not actually exclude Tesla from
153
154
155
156
157
158

Exxon, 437 U.S. at 125.
Id. at 125.
Id.
Id.
Exxon, 437 U.S. at 125.
Id. at 127–28.
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the Michigan market by virtue of its statehood. In Exxon, the
Court undercut any such argument by pointing to the fact that
interstate petroleum sellers (who do not manufacture petroleum)
are not affected by the act, agnostic of statehood. 159 Although Tesla
is not from Michigan, it is not being excluded from selling to
consumers by virtue of its statehood any more than Exxon was
being excluded from operating a retail station by virtue of its
statehood. Both integrated companies were excluded from the
state retail markets because of their status as manufacturers.
Equally so in Maryland and Michigan may out-of-staters sell cars
and petroleum to consumers, so long as the company is not
vertically integrated—a constitutionally permissible result under
Exxon. Section 445.1574, like Section 157E thus does not seem to
“prohibit the flow of interstate goods, place added costs upon
them, or distinguish between in-state and out-of-state companies
in the retail market.” 160
At this point, it seems that the only reason Tesla is not selling
cars in Michigan is because it refuses to sell in any manner other
than direct-to-consumer. 161 The Commerce Clause does not care
about Tesla’s apprehensions. In Exxon, the Court recognized that
the prohibition on manufacturers owning retail stations may cause
some refiners to “withdraw entirely from the Maryland market,”
but it upheld the law, nonetheless. 162 The Court reasoned that
“there is no reason to assume their share of the entire supply will
not be promptly replaced by other interstate refiners.” 163 Tesla
could try to distinguish the effect of Section 445.1574 from the
effect of Section 157E in that petroleum products are almost
entirely fungible while its vehicles and those sold by franchised
dealers in Michigan are not. Indeed, there seems to be a
significantly greater difference between brands of cars than brands
of petroleum. 164
159
Id. at 125–26 (“there are several major interstate marketers of petroleum
that own and operate their own retail gasoline stations. These interstate dealers . . .
are not affected by the Act”).
160 Id. at 126.
161
E.g., Compl., supra note 37, at ¶ 42 (“The Dealer Model is Not Viable for
Tesla”).
162 Exxon, 437 U.S. at 127.
163 Id.
164 See generally Mark Kane, Compare EVs: Guide To Range, Specs, Pricing &
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It is plausible that prohibiting direct-to-consumer auto sales
in Michigan effectively stops Teslas—an interstate good—from
entering the Michigan market, whereas Section 157E prohibited
only gasoline made and sold by a manufacturer from entering the
market—a product immediately replaced by a nonmanufacturer,
such that the market never missed it. However, any such effect is
due to Tesla’s stubborn refusal to abandon direct-to-consumer
sales, rather than a categorical bar to entry. Because the dormant
commerce clause protects the interstate market—not individual
sellers—and the interstate market for Teslas, or EVs generally,
would be significantly hampered by Section 445.1574’s
prohibition, protecting the interstate market itself beckons for
judicial review of Section 445.1574. Finally, the suggestion in
Exxon that vertically integrated petroleum sales displaced by
Section 157E would be readily replaced by other manufacturers is
a fair point of distinction between Exxon in Maryland and Tesla
in Michigan. Tesla currently makes up such a large percentage of
EV sales in the United States that other manufacturers likely
cannot readily replace such sales in the way that petroleum sellers
stood poised to replace their vertically integrated counterparts. 165
Thus, Tesla could make a decent argument that Exxon is factually
distinct from the case at bar while using the central holding of the
case—the dormant commerce clause protects the interstate market
itself—to drive home its conclusion that Section 445.1574
impermissibly afflicts interstate commerce.

More, INSIDEEVS.COM, https://insideevs.com/reviews/344001/compare-evs/ (last
visited Jan. 13, 2022).
165
This may change as heritage manufacturers continue to increase EV
production and position themselves to capture some of Tesla’s market share. See
Motavalli, supra note 4.
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CONCLUSION

The Tesla Wars are still waging in the United States. In the
years to come, the EV market will grow, and manufacturers will
continue their quest to sell direct-to-consumer. Unfortunately,
Tesla’s Michigan lawsuit may have posed more questions than it
answered, and the constitutional issues raised in Tesla, Inc. v.
Benson still loom large. Unless and until states repeal their directto-consumer bans, manufacturers will be forced to turn to the
courts for relief. In pursuing judicial remedies, future litigants will
raise the same point made by Tesla—direct-to-consumer bans
violate the Constitution. This Comment makes clear that such
challenges, however implausible, are worthy of the judicial forum.

